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Honorable David Roberti, President pro Tempore of the Senate 
Honorab Members of the Ca fornia State Senate 
Dear Mr. President and Members: 
for your informat is a report on State Revenue 
Losses from Federal Lands, by the Senate Office of 
Research. The report points out that California is losing mil-
of dollars of the state's legally authorized share of 
land revenues as a result of federal government mismanage-
ment intentional federal efforts to reduce the state's 
of federal land revenues. 
l~out 45% of all land in California is owned by the federal 
(over 45 Ilion acres) and over 59 million acres 
lands offshore California's 1100-mile coastl is 
controlled by the federal government. Revenues owed to the U.S. 
from offshore energy leasing and onshore minerals 
timber lopment are the second largest source of revenue 
by the federal government, exceeded only by federal 
taxes. A substantial share of these federal land revenues 
red by federal law to be shared with states and 1 
For example, in 1983, California's share of onshore fede 
revenues exceeded $65 million, with the bulk of the funds 
to school districts and counties where the federal lands 
are located. And in 1984, the federal government offered Cali-
over $200 million to settle disputed claims over more than 
Ilion in offshore oil revenues. 
The report points out that in addition to refusing to provide 
California with a fair share of offshore oil revenues, the state 
is losing or is threatened with the loss of millions of dollars 
in federal land revenues as a result of: 
• federal mineral royalty mismanagement~ 
• mineral leasing •lottery• scandals; 
• federal agency •undervaluation• of gas production; 
• illegal deductions of federal "windfall profits• taxes from 
state revenue shares; 
• federal proposals to reduce the state share of revenues from 
federal land timber harvesting and grazing~ and 
• federal government use of •appropriation bills• to circumvent 
federal land laws requiring state revenue sharing. 
It is important that the Legislature help guard against the 
erosion of the state's legally authorized share of federal land 
revenues. In particular, counties and school districts dependent 
on federal land revenues will be significantly harmed if revenue 
sharing reductions continue. The report includes a number of 
detailed proposals to address particular revenue sharing problems 
associated with federal offshore energy, onshore minerals, and 
timber and rangeland activities. In addition, the report 
includes general recommendations to establish a comprehensive 
state mechanism to monitor and influence federal land decisions 
having major land use and fiscal impacts in California by creat-
ing a: 
I. FEDERAL LANDS COORDINATION OFFICE, and 
II. FEDERAL LANDS ADVISORY COUNCIL 
If you have any questions about the report, please contact 
Michael Shapiro in the Senate Office of Research (916) 445-1727. 
~~ 
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STATE REVENUE LOSSES FROM OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS 
Report Corrections (Errata Sheet forthcoming) 
State revenue receipts were understated 
Corrections 
Transmittal Letter--1st page: Change $65 million to $78 million 
P. 4 Change $55 million to $68 million 
P. 6 Change $55.6 million to $68.75 million 
















P. 7 County Distribution Table is incorrect--understates funds. 
New table being developed. 
Addtional copies of this publication may be purchased for $5.50 
per copy from: JOINT PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, Box 90, State Capitol, 
Sacramento, CA 95814. Please add 6% sales tax. Make checks 
payable to STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
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COUNTY FEDERAL ACREAGES 
Total % of County 
Land Area Federal OWned by 
County In Acres OWners hiE Government 
Alameda 469,120 6,178 1. 317% 
Alpine 462,720 425,926 94.08 
Amador 379,520 76,987 20.29 
Butte 1,064,320 151,199 14.21 
Calaveras 657,280 128,553 19.56 
Colusa 737,920 111,396 15.10 
Contra Costa 469,760 9, 722 2.07 
Del Norte 641,920 451,743 70.37 
El Dorado 1,096,960 513,830 46.84 
Fresno 3,816,960 1,476,894 38.69 
Glenn 842,880 217,127 25.76 
Humboldt 2,286,720 436,133 19.07 
Imperial 2,741,760 1,499,402 54.69 
In yo 6,458,240 5,172,135 80.09 
Kern 5,217,280 1,246,329 23.89 
Kings 892,800 20,913 2.342 
Lake 803,840 351,170 43.69 
Lassen 2,910,080 1,771,503 60.87 
Los Angeles 2,598,400 763,237 29.37 
Madera 1,372,160 545,661 39.77 
Marin 332,800 11,572 3. 477 
Mariposa 931,200 443,867 47.67 
Mendocino 2,244,480 310,489 13.83 
Merced 1,268,480 24,803 1. 955 
Modoc 2,618,880 1,729,305 66.03 
Mono 1,937,920 1,452,195 74.94 
Monterey 2,127,360 588,387 27.66 
Napa 485,120 72,754 15.00 
Nevada 625,920 159,486 25.48 
Orange 500,480 64,808 12.95 
Placer 911,360 298,532 32.76 
Plumas 1,644,880 1,150,229 69.93 
Riverside 4,593,280 2,489,120 54.19 
Sacramento 629,120 15,279 2.429 
San Benito 893,440 115,039 12.88 
San Bernardino 12,883,840 9,619,763 74.67 
San Diego 2,723,300 750,693 27.57 
San Francisco 28,800 4,224 14.67 
San Joaquin 901,760 9,854 1. 093 
San Luis Obispo 2,122,240 308,360 14.53 
San Mateo 290,560 275 .0946 
Santa Barbara 1,752,320 838,546 47.85 
Santa Clara 833,280 10,717 1. 286 
Santa Cruz 280,960 152 .0541 
Shasta 2,430,720 978,474 40.25 
Sierra 613,120 374,539 61.09 
Siskiyou 4,039,680 2,516,444 62.29 
Solano 529,280 15,553 2.939 
Sonoma 1,010,560 12,355 1.223 
Stanislaus 960,000 16,367 1. 705 
Sutter 388,480 2,592 .6672 
Tehama 1,904,640 460,159 24.16 
Trinity 2,042,240 1,465,593 71.76 
Tulare 3,096,320 1,558,008 50.32 
Tuolumne 1,455,360 1,089,238 74.84 
Ventura 1,184,640 621,395 52.45 
Yolo 661,760 31,510 4.762 
Yuba 407,680 86,352 21.18 
Total 100,206,720 45,076,382 44.98% 
============ ========== ====== 
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I INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
recent Western states, i 
with major 1 land use battles such as the 
Rebe lion" (the le to secure state ownership of 
1 lands) , 1 the "Seaweed Rebellion" (confl 
coastal states and the 1 government over offshore energy 
deve ) , 2 11 zation" (opposition to the current Admin-
istration's mass sale of federal lands to private 
s to reduce the national debt) , 3 and "firesale leasing" 
(contesting a major expans and acceleration of federal mineral 
leasing, which floods the market and generates low bids) . 4 These 
skirmi s over 1 land ownership, 
have sometimes obscured the equal crit 
sposal and development 
1 problem of federal 
seal ra 
federal land laws. 
on state revenue shares guaranteed under 
"Sagebrush and Seaweed Rebellions" 
are on hold, and "privatizat " and " le leasing" temporar-
ing California and other i in check, immed te challenge 
public land states is a stop to "Seaweed and Sagebrush 
, namely government actions which are resulting 
s to states of mi lions of dol s of their legal 
z share of 1 land revenues. 
federal government dominates land ownership in Cali-
45% of all land Cali is owned by 
federal government {see map low), the bulk of which is managed 
Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (over 19 mil-
lion acres of nat 1 forests) and the Department of the Interi-
or s Bureau of Land Management (over 16 million acres of public 
lands). In addition, the Department of the Interior's Minerals 
Management controls over 59 million acres of offshore 
ral ifornia's entire 1100-mile coast. Much of 





DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 




.: BLM OFFICE - CONSERVATION AREA BOUNDARY 
c:::J PUBLIC LAND 
NATIONAL FOREST 
NATIONAL PARK & MONUMENT 
MILITARY RESERVATION 
c:::J INDIAN RESERVATION 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 
SCALE 
NOVE.MIEJt. 1979 
Revenues owed to 
gas, and onshore fuel 
u.s. rnment for offshore oil and 
lizer minerals, t r, and other 
federal land resources are the second st source of revenue 
the federal government receives, exceeded by federal income 
taxes. A substantial share of this federal land revenue is 
by federal law to with states. Several pieces 
of federal legislation have enacted to compensate states for 
the burdens imposed by tax-exempt federal property. They fall 
into two 
1. Federal land revenue sharing programs, and 
2. Payments in lieu of taxes. 
For example, in the federal land revenue sharing area, 
Cali is entitled to a share of federal offshore oil 
revenues was recent offered over 200 million to settle 
disputed claims over more than $1 billion in revenues. Further-
more, in federal fiscal year (FY) 1983, California received over 
55 million from the federal government as its share of revenues 
generated by onshore oil, gas, and geothermal leasing, timber 
sa s, grazing fees, and other uses of federal s in Cali 
n , with the bulk of the funds going to school s 
s where the federal lands are located. 
In the category of payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) , local 
governments in California received over $10 million in 1983. 
The Cali a payments are part of a national PILT program to 
federal land revenue sharing payments to 1 gov-
ernments to compensate in part for property tax revenues lost 






Mineral Leasing Act 
(30 u.s.c. 191) 
Bureau of Land Management 
National Forest 
Management 
(16 u.s.c. 500) 
U.S. Forest Service 
Taylor Grazing Act 
(43 u.s.c. 3151) 
Bureau of Land Management 
Federal Power Act 
(16 u.s.c. 810) 
Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission 
Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
(16 u.s.c. 6901) 
Bureau of Land Management 
Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 
(43 u.s.c. 1337(g)) 
Minerals Management 
Service 
Type of Receipts State Share 
Revenues received from 50'\ state 
mineral leasing (oil, gas, 






Monies received from 
Section 3 grazing 
"districts" 
Monies received from 
Section 15 grazing 
Monies received from 
occupancy and use of 
federal lands 
Annual appropriations 
allocated to local 
governments 
Lease revenues from 
offshore tracts within 








37.5% to state 
75c per federal 
acre less revenue 
sharing funds or 
lOc per federal acre 
with no deductions; 
both have ceiling 







Fublic Resources Code (PRC) 2795-·the first $1.1 mill ion to be deposited in 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Account 
PRC 3821--requires 40\ of the state's share of geothermal revenues to go to 
counties of origin for geothermal related activities 
PRC 3822--requires 30'\ of geothermal revenues to be granted or loaned by the 
Energy Commission to local governments for geothermal projects 
PRC 3825·-requires 30% of geothermal revenues to go to the Renewable Resources 
Investment Fund (PRC 34000) for natural resource and wildlife projects 
PRC 12304-07·-requires federal potash and potassium revenues to be distributed to 
affected school districts and community colleges 
Education Code 12320--all other Mineral Leasing Act monies go to the State School Fund 
Government Code 29484·-apportioned 50\ to county school service funds and 
50\ for county roads 
PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control 
PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control 
No state allocation law--monies go to the State General Fund 
No state allocation law--monies paid directly to counties 
No state allocation law--disputed monies being held in escrow account. 
Collected Nationwide 
California Escrow Account 
Federal to 2 %) 
(RS) 
California received 
(allocated to counties, schools 
and the state) 
Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) 
California counties received 
Total Payments 
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• FY 83 
$55.6 Million 































































(Federal FY 1983) 
Revenue Total 
Sharinq PILT PILT & RS 
0 $ 1,319 $ 1,319 
334,784 38,342 373,126 
303,819 8,268 312,087 
235,820 14,178 249,998 
82,925 14,350 97,275 
67,919 9,502 77,421 
0 1,060 1,060 
662,386 43,465 705,851 
1,889,738 49,437 1,939,175 
675,676 256,172 931,848 
194,285 19,277 213,562 
478,733 1,488,546 1,967,279 
192,414 648,379 840,793 
672' 918 485,741 1,158,659 
214,984 589,442 804,426 
2,142 5,414 7,556 
1,149,160 35' 724 1,184,844 
1,355,965 155,342 1,511,307 
207,764 476,300 684,064 
259,110 87,533 346,643 
0 108,687 108,687 
145,923 153,020 298,943 
218,678 29,235 247,913 
688 28,788 29,476 
666,504 159,310 825,814 
322,800 161,239 484,039 
23,298 268,112 291,410 
1,136 42,778 43,914 
340,706 17,520 358,226 
22,256 19,136 41,392 
755,158 33,830 788,988 
1,554,329 108,867 1,663,196 
27,471 917,520 944,991 
0 3,030 3,030 
9,530 78,705 88,235 
371,338 759,237 1,130,575 
65,734 310,022 375,756 
0 12,470 12,470 
0 881 881 
49,878 228,276 278,154 
0 0 0 
43,245 450,778 494,023 
19,198 5,079 24,277 
0 0 0 
998,463 90,650 1,089,113 
788,254 40,349 828,603 
2,576,939 236,162 2,813,101 
0 3,271 3,271 
703,937 2,339 706,276 
303 3,405 3,708 
0 113 113 
732,311 41,749 7741060 
1,299,369 141,885 1,441,254 
497,953 658,422 1,156,375 
590,301 111,992 702,293 
38,629 448,337 486,966 
1,135 19,501 20,636 

































































In the long term, federal land revenue sharing funds should 
grow tantially as and accelerated resource develop-
ment occurs both onshore and o and as 2.5 million acres of 
l ral s California are opened up for miner-
' fore and other development as a result of the 1984 Cali-
forn Wilderness 11 compromise signed by the President. 8 
However, the following federal actions are significantly under-
cutti state revenue sharing from federal lands: 
California is losing or is threatened with the loss of 
millions of dollars in federal land revenues as a result 
of: 
• the federal government's refusal to provide states 
with a "fair and equitable" share of offshore oil and 
gas revenues; 
• federal mineral royalty mismanagement1 
• mineral leasing "lottery• scandals; 
• federal agency "undervaluation" of gas production; 
• illegal deductions of federal "windfall profits" 
taxes from state revenue shares; 
• federal proposals to reduce the state share of reve-
nues from federal land timber harvesting and grazing: 
and 
• federal government use of "appropriation bills" to 
circumvent federal land laws requiring state revenue 
sharing. 
California is being seriously harmed by federal government 
incompetence as well as intentional federal efforts to reduce 
state and local shares of federal land revenues. The threat of 
continued federal land law revenue sharing losses becomes all the 
more serious as the deficit-ridden, revenue-hungry federal gov-




share of federal land 
d s cts dependent on 
cant if revenue 
to maintain existing 
st 
s, 
the further erosion of its 
icular, counties and school 
revenues will be signifi-
ses continue. Whi -.;vork 
state must also ensure 
monies due to the federal government from federal land 
development, and thus due part to the state because of reve-
nue sharing requirements, are fact fully paid. 
This report describes 
of vast federal land ho 
burdens imposed by the presence 
in offshore California, sum-
marizes federal land revenue sharing programs and related state 
, reviews recent state actions to assess the economic impact 
of federal lands in Cali , identifies specific problems 
causing or threatening to cause offshore oil and gas, onshore 
ral leasing, fores , grazing, and other federal land reve-
nue losses for the state, and provides recommendations for state 
act In addition to led proposals to address the partic-
u r problems cited above, the report includes general recommen-
dations to establish a comprehens state mechanism to monitor 
and influence federal land decisions having major land use and 
fiscal impacts: 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Create a FEDERAL LANDS COORDINATION OFFICE 
II. Create a FEDERAL LANDS ADVISORY COUNCIL 
-9-
II. BACKGROUND9 
Impact of Federal Lands In California 
Federal lands generally are intermixed with state and pri-
vate lands and make up a major portion of the state's real 
estate. Consequently, their use significantly affects the use 
of adjoining lands. Federal land activities often cause substan-
tial development pressures on nearby communities, with increased 
demand for transportation, education, police and fire protection, 
and other public services. 
Minerals, energy and forest development on federal land are 
sometimes accompanied by increases in population, local economic 
readjustments, degradation in water and air quality, losses of 
recreational opportunities, and "boom-bust" towns. In addition, 
federal livestock grazing and range improvement decisions often 
influence the long-term stability of local ranching communities. 
Similarly, federal offshore energy development causes environ-
mental and economic consequences along the coast, which affect 
tourism, recreation, commercial and sport fishing, and other 
segments of the state's economy. 
The dominant and sometimes oppressive character of federal 
land decisions is exacerbated by the fact that many counties in 
which federal ownership is significant tend to have small popula-
tions and lack a significant tax base. With limited financial 
resources to spare, some counties are unable to contend with 
federal land issues. As a consequence, the vast amount of fed-
eral land holdings in California often frustrates local govern-
ment self-determination. 
-10-
Federal Assistance Programs Related to Federal Lands 
States do not have power to tax federal property despite 
the on state and 1 j sdictions to s 
to the 1 as well as to the general public using 
1 owned property. In to this inequ , and to 
1 compensate states and local governments for 
s and the loss of self-determination, several pieces of 
1 legislation have been enacted to provide financial aid. 
These fall into two s: 
1. Federal revenue sharing programs, and 
2. Payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) 
Furthermore, pursuant to the re powers of the states under 
the Constitution, states may impose severance and other taxes on 
private ssees operating on federal lands. 10 
This constitutional and statutory framework influences the 
annual stribution of billions of dollars of revenues generated 
from federal lands. The bulk of California s are 
federal revenue programs related to onshore 1, gas 
geothermal development, fertilizer mineral production, timber 
harvests, offshore oil and gas leasing (currently held up in an 
escrow account) , and the PILT program. 
-11-
Federal Law/Agency 
Mineral Leasing Act 
(30 u.s.c. 191) 
Bureau of Land Management 
National Forest 
Management 
(16 u.s.c. 500) 
U.S. Forest Service 
Taylor Grazing Act 
(43 u.s.c. 315i) 
Bureau of Land Management 
Federal Power Act 
(16 u.s.c. 810) 
Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission 
Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
(16 u.s.c. 6901) 
Bureau of Land ~~nagement 
Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 




F1IDERAL MID CALIFOIUUA LAWS OONCERIIII'JG F1IDERAL REVENUE SHARING 
Type of Receipts State Share 
Revenues received from 50\ to state 
mineral leasing (oil, gas, 






Monies received from 
Section 3 grazing 
"districts11 
Monies received from 
Section 15 grazing 
Monies received from 
occupancy and use of 
federal lands 
Annual appropriations 
allocated to local 
governments 
Lease revenues from 
offshore tracts within 








37.5!!i, to state 
75¢ per federal 
acre less revenue 
sharing funds or 
lOc per federal acre 
with no deductions; 
both have ceiling 







Public Resources Code (PRC) 2795--the first $1. c million to be deposited in 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Account 
PRC 3821--requlres 40% of the state's share of geothermal revenues to go to 
counties of origin for geothermal related activities 
PRC 3822--requires 30% of geothermal revenues to be granted or loaned by the 
Energy Commission to local governments for geothermal projects 
PRC 3825--requires 30% of geothermal revenues to go to the Renewable Resources 
Investment Fund (PRC 34000) for natural resource and wildlife projects 
PRC 12304-07--requires federal potash and potassium revenues to be distributed to 
affected school districts and community colleges 
Education Code 12320--all other Mineral Leasing Act monies go to the State School Fund 
Government Code 29484--apportioned 50% to county school service funds and 
50% for county roads 
PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control 
PRC 8557.5--to be used for range improvements and predator control 
No state allocation law--monies go to the State C~neral Fund 12 
No state allocation law--monies paid directly tc counties
13 






Some states sting federal revenue 
of equ com-
states and ss of self-
, reduced tax revenues, caused 
ral lands, and to in full control over 
In 1980, Cal pas AB 2302 (Hayes) , in 
modest way, formal "Sagebrush Rebellion" the 
rm to ef s to wrest ownership of publ lands from 
the federal 1 AB 2302 the State Lands 
ssion, Attorney General, Governor's Office of Planning and 
Research, and Department of 
study of California 
(BLM) with a view towards 
A 
to AB 2302 concluded 
1 lands were most 





AB 2302 cal 
ted to the Governor 
to the question of 
was to address local 
future BLM land mana 
a 
was issued entitled 
rnatives for State 
on ions for state 
and Game to joint conduct a 
by the Bureau of Land Management 
state ownership of such lands. 
General's Office 
forts to secure state of 
doomed to failure. 15 This 
a federal 9th Circu Court of 
ruled against Nevada's c to 
j agency to 
s by January 1, 1982. In addi-
ownership and control, the 
and costs associated with current and 
s. In May of 1982 a "draft" 
and the Federal Lands: 
document focused ly 
1 land management; only minor 
attention was paid to fisca issues. A final report has yet to 
be submitted. 
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In 984, Cali SB 1726 (Keene) 17 whi re-
quires Director of Forestry to prepare a st and range-
land resources 
an assessment 
,January 1, ch must lude 
s respect to 
land and The legislation not only 
ls with also calls for an evaluation of 
economic 
issues, 
fits and costs. 
Also in 1984, i legislature passed SB 1673 
) , the Governor to coordinate a process to 
1 1 government ipation in reviewing and com-
menting on federal o leasing development proposals. 
The bill also establi a 1 government energy advisory 
committee charged with making recommendations to the Governor 
concern the development of coastal energy resources and the 
of coastal tourism and I 1 
s fishing and other competing economic interests. 





of problems as with 





s which focus on preventing 
of dollars of offshore and 




) of the Outer lf (OCS) Act 
f 1978 1 coastal states a to a and 
of s, revenues 
oil and tracts leased three miles of the 
les of ) , those 
geological structures ls of oil) common to 
1 and state 1 If the Department of the 
and a coastal state governor cannot a iated 
on a division of these revenues, the Interior Depart-
ment may with sing is red to place into 
escrow OCS revenues from the 3-6 le tracts 1 as 
an or a federal district court 
the al of funds 
Since 1978, been 
t"h Ca i 
over 8(g) s. 
In escrow accounts grown 
enormous to over 1 
shared 
and ifornia. 
Texas ch the on s issue, 













under OCS Lands Act states are on entit 








was recent approved by a federal dis-
state a 50% share of "enhanced" 
to $335 mil 20 Under Texas 
may a c to a 
" bonus revenues if 
ifornia submerged lands l 
state can prove that previous 




formation about nearby federal 
value of those federal tracts. 21 
s not appear to be liz 
on s opportunity. Following the Texas decision, the Secretary 
coastal states a settlement equalling of of 
16 2/3% of bonuses and rental payments, plus interest, for leased 
al 
to 
in the 3-6 mi zone. Under this proposal, Ca fornia 
Federal Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act Escrowed Revenues 
Collected Nationwide 
California Escrow Account 






of offer, but instead were to be 
Department's court-rejected proposal 
states a of roya s from oil and gas determined 
to have been " 11 from state submerged lands. In addition, 
conditions which could inhibit state chal-conta 
s to the size of offshore lease sales, thus opening the door 
to overzealous " sa II ing, flooding the market with 
tracts and generating 
After rc;presentatives from seven coastal states met to dis-
cuss of , including four Governors (California was repre-
of Environmental Affairs), it was con-
as and rejected by all states with the sole 
. b . c l'f . 22 except1on e1ng a 1 orn1a. 
-16-
(a) The Legislature should ask the Governor for a report 
on the status of OCS 8(g) negotiations, and should 
specifically explanation of why Califor-
nia's position other coastal 
states .. 
(b) The Governor should a lawsuit against the 
Department of the Interior if the S(g) offer is 
determined to be inadequate and negotiations break 
down. 
{c) The Legislature develop legislation to allo-
cate future OCS 8(g) funds received by the state. 
The •seaweed Rebellion• OVer OCS Revenue Sharing 
On September 13, 1984, House of sentatives adopted 
312-94 a conference report on s. 246 , a bill which gives all 
coastal states and territories 4% of OCS revenues, up to $300 
million a year, for block grants to state and local programs 
coastal research, , planning, management and devel-
t . . . 
2 3 c 1 . f . ld . b t . 1 opment ac 1v1t1es. a 1 orn1a wou rece1ve a ou m1 -
from this program if it is established. The Reagan 
Administration opposes the bill and threatened a veto. On Octo-
ber 9, 1984, Senators in support of the President's position 
threatened a filibuster, and the bill died in the Senate. 
While OCS Lands Act B(g) funds are intended to benefit 
on a few states with ral OCS leasing in the adjacent 3-6 
mile belt, OCS revenue ring slation is based on the 
that a modest portion of federal revenues derived 
from the extraction of publ owned, non-renewable offshore 
e resources should reinvested in all coastal states for 
the sound management of renewable coastal resources. 24 
-17-
The Seaweed Rebels who support the legislation point out that 
the Reagan Administration has reduced or eliminated funding for 
state coastal programs (e.g., Coastal Zone Management, Coastal 
Impact Assistance, Sea Grant Research, Fisheries Manage-
ment) at the same time that it has accelerated and expanded its 
OCS sing program, which is expected to generate an estimated 
$6 billion in FY 1985. In California, the Department of the 
Interior has plans to open up for oil and gas leasing 59 million 
acres offshore from Mexico to the Oregon border. 25 
While the benefits of OCS leasing are spread across the 
nation, socioeconomic and environmental risks are concentrated 
local Without federal assistance, most state and local gov-
ernments will be hard pressed to plan for and manage develop-
ment associated with offshore energy activities. Federal funding 
is also needed to build on the progress made to date in state 
coastal research, education, management, protection and fisheries 
programs. Supporters also point out that as a matter of fairness 
and equity, OCS revenue sharing would bring coastal states and 
affected local governments into partial conformity with their 
counterparts who receive a share of onshore federal oil and 
gas revenues under the Mineral Leasing Act. Furthermore, while 
states may impose severance taxes on federal lands onshore, 26 the 
OCS Lands Act prohibits state taxation of offshore minerals. 27 
OCS Revenue Sharing Recommendation 
(a) The state should continue to support legislation 









Mineral Royalty Fraud and Mismanagement 
Serious deficiencies the federal government's mineral 
resulted in hundreds of mi royal s 
lions of dollars in losses, representing as much as a 10% royalty 
shortfall. This has been enormously costly to public land states 
because for every dollar of underpayment, states lose fifty 
cents. 
In response to widespread reports of theft of federal oil, 
industry failure to report oil production and federal agency 
mismanagement of onshore oil royalty collection, the Linowes 
Commission on the Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy 
Resources was established in 1981 by the Department of the Inte-
rior. The following year the commission issued a report 30 con-
rming serious deficiencies including: 
• failure to verify production data; 
• failure to maintain adequate accounting records; 
• failure to impose penalties for late payments; 
• failure to require adequate site security; 
• chronic understaffing. 
nowes Commission recommended a strengthened royalty manage-
ment system and increased coordination with states. 
Passage of the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 
982 established a framework for efficient royalty management and 
a basis for federal-state coordination. 31 
The Act provides for: 
• "cooperative" federal-state audit agreements; 
• the "delegation" to states of federal royalty management 
authority; 








Al federal law authorizes 1 state reimbursement for 
auditing costs, under recently issued federal lty management 
regu only 50% of state co ts incurred pursuant to "cooper-
at audit agreements" 11 by federal government. 
s means that states 11 not their full 50% revenue 
share will be augmenting federal budget by providing free 
d ' 34 au asslstance. 
While good news is that the regulations call for 100% 
reimbursement costs associated th federal "delegations" to 
states of roya management authority, the bad news is that the 
federal government has been slow in implementing a delegation 
program. No funds have been requested for delegations, and the 
meager sum of only $1.5 llion is being sought in FY 1985 to pay 
for up to 8 cooperative agreements, to the suspicion that 
e state icipation is not welcomed the federal 
government. 35 
than establishing a constructive working relationship, 
cooperative agreements have le states frustrated and upset. 
State auditors been discovering unrecorded oil and gas pro-
i wells, late payments interest paid, supposedly 
shutdown wells in production, proposals to "write-off" royalty 





sal to formation, and general resistance 
have undermined cooperative efforts to 
36 s. 
s situation has raised the question, "If 
1 and gas roya s are a mess, what other resource based 
revenue programs are affected?" 37 Between 1980-84, California 
received over $16 million in federal geothermal leasing revenues 
and over $15 million from federal potash development, and the 
annual state revenue from these minerals are rising. No 
audits have ever performed on geothermal or potash royalties 
to verify that the proper amount of royalties has been paid to 
state. In August 1984, the State Controller requested audit 







the state for •delegated" 
should also urge the Depart-
Interior to issue federal regulations 
100% reimbursement for st~~e costs 
with •cooperative agreements.• 
(c) State royalty management 
extended beyond onshore to 
other federal resource revenue 
geothermal, , , etc .. ) 
if it is determined that federal mismanagement 
other resource sectors causing significant losses 
in state or revenue shares. 
-23 
Under the 1 Leas Act, the oil and gas leasing pro-
cess differs depending on Is are 
cons to be part of a " geologic structure" (KGS) or 
an unknown deposit. KGS areas are accessible only through com-
peti bidding. Lands that lie outside a KGS are generally 
leased through a noncompetitive lottery system. In the lottery 
system, anyone submitting a $75 entry fee and willing to pay a 
$1 per acre annual rental may enter and possibly win a lease. 
Nationally, about 97% of all mineral leasing is done through the 
lottery system. In FY 83, of the 396 oil and gas leases issued 
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in California, 395 were 
noncompetitive. 
A major problem with the lottery is that deprives the 
federal treasury and state governments of substantial amounts 
of money because highly valuab mineral deposits have been 
leased for a song. Errors in KGS determinations have cost states 
mill of dollars. For example, in 1983, BLM leased tracts in 
adjacent to producing oil wells through the lottery for 
r acre rental Two-thirds of the leases were then 
reass to energy companies for huge sums. It has been esti-
mated leases were worth $50-$100 million, and the 
state lost half that value due to the lottery. 
A similar error cost the State of Arkansas $30 million 
a BLM leased 33,000 acres of valuable oil and gas lands 
$1 acre. Adjacent tracts were being sold for $4000 per acre. 
Arkansas successfully sued BLM to cancel the leases arguing that 
BLM breached its obligation to protect the state's 50% share 
of revenues. 39 While no one can be certain about the scope of 
the problem, a public and congressional outcry over extensive 
fraud and abuse led to a temporary suspension of the lottery in 
1983. 40 
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The ss 1 
eral government could 
s concluded that the fed-
increase its mineral revenues 
el to a 
t b al s system, 
net rece 00 per year, th half 
to public land states. Feder a slation was 
1983 to e in the face of Admin-
istrat opposition. 
is the $75 received 
$90 million a year, is not red BLM, which 
th states 1 Leasing Act formula. States 
share in $ per acre annual rental. BLM argues that its 
filing covers admini costs and is not subject to the 
statutory revenue sha requirement. However the fees greatly 
exceed administrative costs appear to be used as a 
federal revenues at of the states. 
Lottery Recommendations 
(a) As long as the lottery continues, the state should 
seek authority to review selectively noncompetitive 
proposals prior to leasing to ensure that valuable 
mineral reserves are not leased for less than fair 
market value. The state should negotiate an agree~ 
ment with the BLM to obtain geologic information, 
well activity in the vicinity, and other pertinent 
information, and should examine adjacent state and 
private leasing activity when appropriate. 
(b) The state should support federal legislation to 
secure a 50% share of lottery filing fees, and 
also consider joining other states in a test case 
challenging the withholding of these funds. 
(c) California should support federal legislation to 
eliminate the lottery and replace it with an all 
competitive leasing system. 
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ce to 
Natural gas on federal ses California 
the 1 Leas 
1 and gas 
revenue re revenue is 
now under new 
1 va natural gas which cou cost 
Cali states of dollars in 
revenues. 42 The new se value on 
"contract ," rej current 
highest price of gas at nearby wells 
of using the 
the same general produc-
t area. 
The problem with the new gu 
gas contracts are not "arms 
contracts are af 1 
1 is that 
s 
majority of 
80% of the 
an 
the ce of s low. The proposed guidel 
st 
s would 
ft the burden to government to prove the "contract price" 
s not ref va 
Linowes that gas undervaluation has 
or cause of underpayment, and the prob-
11 worsen as gas s rise by 1990 to represent about 
f 11 . d 43 + h . 75% o a s pal . ~ The Department o~ t e Inter1or 
proposal this warning and exacerbates the problem. Ru 
making to the 
of 1984. 
guide s is scheduled to take 
Natural Gas Valuation Recommendation 
(a) California should oppose the proposed guidelines 
natural gas valuation, and if necessary should 
support federal legislation or join in a judicial 
action against the Department of the Interior to 
overturn the guidelines. 
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Government 
The 1 crude oi tax t_o recoup 
and 























s revenues, U.S. Treasury 




the sta s' 
states of the 
Act. The State 
application of this 
of 
state's share of royalties paid by federal oil 
As 
i 
that the deduct of the tax from gross 
s state's 50% entit 
1 Leas Act. A 1 
favor of the state; the case 45 is on appeal. 
'.j-, 1 ..... 
of Western states 
II 
a result, states were 




taxes in excess 
of over $26 
$1.25 mil-
support New Mexico's litigation 
should consider actions to secure reme-
legis if litigation is not 
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Backdoor Federal Appropriation Maneuvers 
In FY 84 and FY 85 rtment of the 




bution of the states' 50% 
revenues prior to the distri-
In other words, states would 
r~ceive 50% of net than gross revenues. In effect, 
through appropriation , the Interior Department sought 
to indirectly amend the Mineral Leasing Act's revenue sharing 
formu This maneuver wou state revenues by 
about $15 mill California losing about $1 million. 
Thus far Congress s rejected these proposals. 
Similarly, the federal government has unsuccessfully 
attempted to fund the Payment of Taxes (PILT) program 
from mineral royalties, again seeking to reduce states' 
share. The PILT program is current funded general reve-
nues through annual appropriations. The Reagan Administration 
consistently opposed the PILT program, and budget appropria-
tions are always uncertain. 
Appropriation Recommendation 
(a) California should oppose federal government appro-
priation lls which seek to diminish the states• 
50% Mineral Leasing Act share by deducting royalty 
management and PILT program costs from mineral roy-





































V. PROTECTING CALIFORNIA 1 S SHARE OF 
NATIONAL FOREST AND RANGEI.AND REVENUES 
$43 million 







































Over 6 million acres of National 
Forest lands in California are managed 
for timber production, and this acre-
will significantly increase with 
the implementation of the 1984 Cali-
a Wilderness bill which opens 
an additional 2.5 million acres for 
development. Twenty-five percent 
(25%) of federal timber sale revenues 
are distributed to the state for 
cu 
ture on roads and schools in 
counties producing the revenues, 
the state received more than 
State payments 
sed on gross rather than net 
--the base amount used to cal-
state revenues includes road 
construction and reforestation credits 
provided to purchasers of timber. 
These local government revenues are 
now seriously threatened by a Reagan 
Administration proposal to modify the 
sting revenue sharing scheme. The 
President's FY 85 budget calls for a 
legislative initiative to eliminate 
the 25% revenue sharing formula and 
with a system ing individual counties to assess 
on its timber holdings as if they and tax the federal 
were lands. 
the value of nat 
tax 
Local assessors would be required to appraise 
1 forest lands and apply state and local prop-
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Timber harvesting counties fear that under the proposed sys-
tem they will receive only a fraction of the total money they 
rece under the current formula. Many counties in central and 
rn California conta substantial federal forestlands, and 
the 25% revenue share makes up a significant portion of total 
county revenues. Reductions in National Forest funds could seri-
ously impede their ability to maintain county roads, bridges and 
schools. 
The Reagan Administration argues that the new approach will 
eliminate year-to-year revenue fluctuations, create equity among 
counties with active timber harvesting and those with forest 
lands used primarily for recreation, and eliminate school and 
road earmarking requirements. The Administration also maintains 
that under their proposed program no county would receive less 
than the average amount paid between 1977-1983. 
The proposal appears to be simply another effort by the 
Reagan Administration to reduce state revenue sharing under the 
guise of providing counties with predictable, no-strings-attached 
funds. The Administration fails to mention that during the 
1977-1983 revenue sharing base period, the forest products indus-
try reduced production to the lowest level in the post-World War 
II period while sufferring from the most sustained timber indus-
try depression since the "Crash of '29". Furthermore, the base 
amount that each county is guaranteed is fixed, and its value 
deteriorates over time with inflation. 
As for the other alleged advantages, counties are able to 
manage revenue fluctuations by earmarking forestry monies for 
multi-year capital improvements rather than operating expenses, 
and inequities among counties in federal land revenue sharing 
payments are already factored into the Payments In Lieu of Taxes 
program. As for earmarking limitations, the schools and roads 
limitations can be eliminated without modifying the 25% formula. 
Furthermore, the proposed system would create an administrative 
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nightmare, with county assessors charged with the responsibility 
and costs of apprais llions of acres of National Forest 
lands. 46 
Administration's proposal is further complicated by the 
that California s not impose a property tax on forest 
l Instead the state appl s a Timber Yield Tax--a severance 
tax on the volume of harvested on both private and public 
lands, including National Forest lands. 47 Thus, conceivably the 
state would gain nothing from the proposal if it only authorizes 
the application of sting state and local "property tax" laws 
to forest lands. If the proposal provides the state with the 
equivalent of the revenues generated by the Timber Yield Tax, the 
benefits would be minimal as the state's timber severance tax 
receipts are far less that the received under the current 
h . f 48 . h . revenues ar1ng ormula. ~ The temptat1on would t.en ar1se 
to increase timber valuation to generate a greater tax ld. 
Resistance by the timber industry and tax assessment limitations 
by Proposition 13, the tax-cutting measure passed by 
California voters in 1978, would then come into play. 
In the face of intense criticism, the Nat 1 Forest Service 
has retreated from an immediate plan to introduce legislation, 
tead has instituted a study to assess the impact of the 
l in 40 counties nationwide, including 5 California coun-
s (Butte, Plumas, Los Angeles, Tulare and Humboldt). 
Interestingly, the Administration's proposal comes at a t 
when legislation has been introduced to increase state revenue 
to 50% in recognition of the fact that in some counties 
costs of building and maintaining the infrastructure to ser-
vice national forest lands has been higher than the existing 25% 
revenue share, and that the 50% share conforms to the Mineral 
Leasing Act formula. 49 Fac Administration opposition, the 
slation failed to pass Congress this year. 
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National Forest Lands Recommendations 
(a) The state should actively monitor the Forest Ser-
vice tax study and should continue to oppose legis-
lation to impose a new local property tax scheme on 
national forest lands, unless it can be demon~brated 
that the state will be as well or better off. 
(b) The state should support federal legislation to 
increase the national forest land revenue sharing 
formula to 50%. 
(c) When implementing SB 1726 (Keene), which requires an 
assessment and critique of federal policies regard-
ing timberland management, the Director of Forestry 
shou~d i~clude gytailed consideration of revenue 
shar1ng 1ssues. 
Potential Loss of Federal Grazing Land Revenues 
In California, grazing by cattle, sheep and horses takes 
place on 9 million acres of federal lands. Most of this acre-
is in poor condition and in need of improvement to increase 
forage. The Taylor Grazing Act requires that 12~% of revenues 
obtained from Section 3 "grazing district" fees and 50% of reve-
nues generated from Section 15 grazing on isolated tracts go to 
the counties in which the lands are situated. In 1983, Califor-
nia received about $150,000 as its share of grazing fees. Reve-
nues were modest due in part to the poor condition of the range 
and low fees. 
State Share of 







The current fee structure runs through 1985, at which time 
the Administration must report to Congress with a recommended fee 
52 schedule for subsequent years. A report to Congress, to be 
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tted jointly the BLM and Forest Service, is scheduled for 
completion in March 1985. 
and December 1984 
In a recent meeti of 
l meetings will be held in Novem-
comments. 
Western slative Conference, 
BLM distributed a "Grazing Fee and 
Eva ",which scribed the grazing fee formula and 
process. In discuss 
that all rangelands not 
fees or addi 
ivity, the 
report, the BLM stated 
upgraded. Rather than adjust 
to improve range 
may be laying the 
groundwork for allowing rangeland deterioration to continue. 
It is also ss 
arrangements whereby 
ion for making 
s is that imp 
tions to counties if 
le that the federal government will consider 
ing ttees would receive a fee 
range improvements. The problem with this 
could reduce revenue di 
receive a share of funds based on net 
revenues computed after the pe credit is deducted. What-
ever final outcome, a new fee system should promote the sta-
bility of family and rural communit s 
upon federal thout reducing county revenues. 
Grazing Land Recommendations 
(a) The state should support congressional appropria-
tions for federal rangeland improvements to enhance 
the value of the federal range and thereby increase 
local revenue sharing. 
(b) The state should monitor the Administra-
tion's to recommending changes in 
the grazing fee structure after 1985. 
(c) The state should support a federal grazing permittee 
range improvement credit program only if the state 
revenue share is based on gross revenues computed 
prior to the (which is how Forest Service 
credits are handled). 
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to state and coordination, there 
needs to be better affected 
local s. sent state and l support, 
unable to many rura areas, l 
ficant l land 
If new to support se state 
local consider charging 
federal land users state d 














a Federal Lands Coordina-
and monitor major federal 
, and to coordinate the 
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• Environmentalists 
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PROTECTING CALIFORNIA'S SHARE OF 
NATIONAL FOREST AND RANGELAND REVENUES 
National Forest Lands Recommendations 
(1) The state should actively monitor the Forest Ser-
vice tax study and should continue to oppose legis-
lation to impose a new local property tax scheme on 
national forest lands, unless it can be demonstrated 
that the state will be as well or better off. 
(2) The state should support federal legislation to 
increase the national forest land revenue sharing 
formula to 50%. 
(3) When implementing SB 1726 (Keene), which requires an 
assessment and critique of federal policies regard-
ing timberland management, the Director of Forestry 
should include detailed consideration of revenue 
sharing issues. 
Grazing Land Recommendations 
(4) The state should support congressional appropria-
tions for federal rangeland improvements to enhance 
the value of the federal range and thereby increase 
local revenue sharing. 
(5) The state should actively monitor the Administra-
tion's activities related to recommending changes in 
the grazing fee structure after 1985. 
(6) The state should support a federal grazing permittee 
range improvement credit program only if the state 
revenue share is based on gross revenues computed 
prior to the credit (which is how Forest Service 
credits are handled). 
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VII. FOOTNOTES 
See general "Comment 1 
Control II 980 Utah 505 
(1980) i Le "Unravel Sagebrush Law, 
Politics and Federal II 14 u.c. Davis Law 317 
(1980). 
See "Note, Seaweed Rebell Federal-State Conflict 
OVer Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing," 18 Willamette Law Review 
535 (1982): "Note, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Contin-
uing Federal-State Con OCS Oil and Gas Leasing," 20 
Willamette Law 83 (1984). 
3. The Reagan Administrat s most extensive 
transfer of publ property to private control in recent 
American history. See Order No. 12,348, 47 Fed-
(1982). Millions of acres of federal 
Bureau o 
vice lands, worth 1 of 
and Forest Ser-
llars may be put on the 
auction block. Also known as "Asset Management" in the 
Department of , the "privatization" program 
con temp s sales of to 5% of federal lands each year 
to the highest bidder, with hopes of sing $4 bill a 
year to reduce the deficit. "Privatization" could 
severely reduce state revenue sharing benefits if federal 
ral and timber s are sold to private parties. 
program also 
governments of 
to deprive states and local 
s to obta federal land for 
schools, parks and other needed purposes. Existing law 
allows state and 1 governments to secure surplus federal 
land at less then 
public purposes. 
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value for recreation and other 
4. "Firesale leasing" of offshore oil and gas and onshore coal 
resources led Congress to impose moratoria on these programs 
after outcries over leases issued for less than fair market 
value, threats of environmental damage, and allegations of 
illegal bidding activities. For example, in a June 1982 
nationwide federal offshore "Reoffering" sale covering lands 
offered but not sold the previous year, including tracts 
offshore California, some of the California tracts were 
leased for millions of dollars under bids that were rejected 
as too low a year earlier; and in holding the largest coal 
sale in the nation's history in Wyoming's Powder River 
Basin, the Interior Department sold the federal coal for an 
average of 3.5¢ per ton, while privately owned tracts in the 
same area sold their coal for 18-20¢ per ton just months 
earlier. See the Wilderness Society's Report on the Park, 
Wilderness and Public Lands Policies of the Reagan Adminis-
tration (1981-1984), Washington, D.C., June 27, 1984. 
5. These figures are derived from the California Almanac, 
1984-85 Edition, Table 8.1, published by Pacific Data 
Resources, Novato, Cal. (1984). 
6. Under the PILT program, counties receive the greater of 75¢ 
per acre for certain federal lands in the county less deduc-
tions for federal land revenue sharing payments, or 10¢ per 
acre with no deductions; both formulas are subject to ceil-
ing amounts based on county population. 31 U.S.C. 6901 et. 
seq. 
7. These figures are derived from the California Auditor Gener-
al's Report, Statement of Federal Land Payments, October 1, 
1982 Through September 30, 1983, F-467, August 1984; Cali-
fornia State Controller, Annual Report 1982-83 Financial 
Transactions Concerning Counties of California, 1984. 
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8. H.R. 1437, 98 ss 1st Se s (1983); signed into 
Reagan after California law in 1984 Pres 
Senators Cranston and Wilson a compromise on wilder-
ness acreage. 
9. For a 
1 lands 
discussion on the impact of 
Western States and federal land revenue 
sharing , see Sal 
of Western States in 
1 Lands, scussion 
of the Western s 
fax, The Financial Interest 
from the Federal Pub-
Educational Project 
Conference and the Lincoln Insti-
tute of Land Policy, (1984). See also, Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, The Adequacy of Federal 
Compensation to Local Governments for Tax Exempt Federal 
Lands, Commission Report A-68, GPO, Wash., D.C. 1978; U.S. 
Comptroller General, 
10. See footnotes 38 and 47 fra, and accompanying text. 
11. This covers only those programs which sig-
nificant revenues the state. Examples of excluded pro-
grams sa of public land and materials (5% 
state share) ch $35,329 in 1982, and federal 
government 
county share 
sitions of park and wilderness lands (1% 
5 generated $14,978 in 1982. 
12. In federal FY 1983, $567,302 was deposited in the State 
General Fund. 
13. PILT funds are paid rectly to counties by the federal 
may be used counties for any governmental 
purpose. In 1983, PILT Act was amended to change the 
definit of eligible 11 1 government", adding smaller 
units of general se government addition to counties, 
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and authorizing state s to enact s to 
reallocate PILT payments in whole or in part to these 
smaller local bodies. The amendment to the Act 
further provides 
PILT funds wou 
to local governments. 
states enact such s , 
to the state for redistribution 
14. See California Public Resources Code Section 6201.5, added 
by Chapter 831, 0. 
15. See "State Sovereignty and the Public Lands: A Report 
Prepared Pursuant to Chapter 831, Statutes of 1980," by Jan 
Stevens, Deputy Attorney General (December 8, 1982). 
16. Nevada v. U.S., 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983). In the 
absence of power to take control over federal lands, public 
land states like Ca fornia must rely on the consultation, 
coordination and consistency provisions of federal planning 
and management statutes to influence federal land decisions. 
State and local governments are granted various degrees of 
influence over federal lands under the: 
--Federal Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.) 
--National Forest Management Act of 1976; Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1978 (16 u.s.c. 
1600 et seq.) 
--Public Rangelands Improvement Act (43 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) 
--Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 u.s.c. 661 et seq.) 
--Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 u.s.c. 1330 et seq.) 
--Coastal Zone Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.) 
--National Environmental Policy Act (42 u.s.c. 4321 et seq.) 
17. See Public Resources 4789.3, as amended, added by Chap-
ter 835, Statutes of 1984. 
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18. Pursuant to the federal Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 
local governments may submit their lease sale and develop-
ment recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior, 
but must forward them through the Governor (43 U.S.C. 1345). 
Local governments lobbied for SB 1673 after complaining 
about inadequate federal public notice, hearing and consul-
tation procedures which undermined their ability to partici-
pate effective in offshore leasing decisions. In the 
Governor's letter returning the bill without signature, he 
maintained that existing procedures for local government 
participation were satisfactory. Governor's letter to mem-
bers of the California Senate, on SB 1673, September 28, 
1984. 
19. 43 U.S.C. Section 1337(g). 
20. Texas v. Secretary of the Interior, 580 F. Supp 1197 (E.D. 
Tex. 1984)--on appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
A Louisiana federal district court followed suit by adopting 
the Texas decision--see Louisiana v. Department of the Inte-
rior, Civ. No. 79-2965 (E.D. La., May 16, 1984). See gener-
ally, Andrew Kever, "A Fair and Equitable Division of Fed-
eral OCS Revenues: The 8(g) Chapter," Summer 1984 Western 
Natural Resources Litigation (hereafter WNRL) Digest 17. 
21. Texas also managed to secure an injunction preventing the 
federal government from unilaterally withdrawing funds pre-
viously escrowed. The California State Lands Commission 
believes that despite the Texas court injunction, close to 
$500 million plus interest may have been withheld from the 
California escrow account by the Department of the Interior. 
See "An Assessment of the Provisions of Section 8(g) Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 on Califor-
n 's Share of Bonuses, Royalties and Other Revenues," Cali-
fornia State Lands Commission, July 1984. 
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22. It is 
coastal state 
at have 
23 . 2463 (Stevens 
24. s. 2463, 
and local 
only affected 
lican isan cons 
98 
s pos 
• , 1st. Sess. (1983). 
allocated to coastal states 
a formula tied to coastal 
to ocs s 
vo of OCS 1 and status of the state's 
{states with federally approved coastal 
programs, i 1 funds). 
25. See , "Status o Energy Leasing Activities 
fornia, Winter 1 84 12. 
26. See s 38 
27. See 43 u.s.c. 1333 
451 u.s. 725 (1981) 
on OCS natural s 
2 • On June 0, 1983 and 
Senate sent 
slation to Ca. 
47 text. 
) ( 2) (A) ; see a 
{overturning s 
the state). 
, 1983, members of the Cali-
support of OCS revenue sharing 
's U.S. House delegat and U.S. 
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